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Partially funded by Pontikes Center at Southern Illinois University - Carbondale
communication cost (Malone 87). Two problems with
Malone’s analysis, first, the domain of coordination is
narrowly focused at the point of exchange. A broader
view is that the transaction coordination includes
coordination in pre-exchange, exchange, and postexchange stages. Product description cannot sufficiently
surrogate the entire domain of transaction coordination.
Secondly, beside product description other important
aspects of a product contribute significantly to the
selection of transaction structure.

Abstract
This paper introduces a new construct, product
complexity, to the research of transaction structure.
Product complexity is a multidimensional construct,
which is defined in terms of product transferability,
product modularbility, and product information intensity.
The majority of previous studies on transaction structure
are based on the attributes of transactions, i.e., asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. This study adds a
dimension of product properties to the research and opens
up a new perspective.

The Contribution of This Paper
The motivation of this study is to illuminate aspects of
a product which influence and shape transaction
structures. Previous transaction cost studies emphasized
the attributes of transaction. Little consideration has been
given to the properties of products as an influential factor
in selecting transaction governance structure. The major
exception is Malone’s introduction of the complexity of
product description (Williamson 1981, 1991, Malone,
Yates and Benjamin 1987, Gurbaxani and Whang 1991).
This paper brings a broader perspective into transaction
cost analysis by including product complexity.

Introduction
The study of transaction structures has drawn
researchers attention since very early days. Coase first
raised the question of why a firm exists (Coase 1937,
1960). Economists have observed how the invisible hand
mediates supply and demand in the marketplace (Smith
1776). Organizations have examined how the visible
hand manages organizations (Chandler, 1977). Oliver
Williamson linked two transaction structures, market and
hierarchy, with transaction cost theory. He claims that
when market transaction cost increases beyond a certain
point, the market will fail and hierarchy will gain
advantage due to the relative efficient internal
coordination (Williamson 1979, 1981, and 1991).

Figure 1 The Theoretical Model of the Paper
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- Uncertainty
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Malone and others recently studied how information
technology affects transaction structure. According to
Malone and others, markets are more communication
intensive than hierarchies. Therefore, markets benefit
more from communication cost reductions that are
induced by advances in information technology. The net
result is a shift toward market structure as information
technology develops (Malone et. al 1987).
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Malone and others introduced the concept of
complexity of product description. They define the
concept as the amount of information needed to specify
the attributes of a product in enough detail to allow
potential buyers to make purchasing decisions. They
believe that products with complex descriptions are more
likely to be obtained through hierarchies due to the

Figure 1 is the theoretical model of this paper. The
theoretical model proposes that attributes of transaction
and product complexity are the influential factors on
transaction cost which, in turn, determine the selection of
transaction governance structure.
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Traditional transaction theory specifies that the
selection of transaction governance structure is based on
the three attributes of transaction, i.e., asset specificity,
frequency, and uncertainty.

among its sub-components, and between a product and its
external entities. Product complexity is a
multidimensional construct. Specifically, three concepts
that define product complexity are product transferability,
product modularbility, and information intensiveness.

• Asset specificity is the degree to which an asset can be
redeployed to alternative uses without losing its
productive value. Asset specificity is further
decomposed into three subcategories, physical asset,
human asset, and site asset (Williamson 1981, 1991).
• Uncertainty has two categories: information
uncertainty and resources uncertainty.
• Frequency is the rate of transaction recurrence.

Table 1. The Elements of Transferability
Elements of
Transferability

Degree of
Transferability

Physical
Transferability

Low

High

The transactions differ in degree of their attributes are
aligned with different transaction governance structures
(market or hierarchy) that differ in their competencies and
costs. Generally, when asset specificity is low, the market
transaction structure is more economical. When asset
specificity is high, hierarchy gains the advantage of lower
governance cost. Internal coordination is more effective
then market coordination (Williamson 1981, 1991).

Mobility

Fixed

Mobile

Quantity

Large
Volume

Stability

Perishable

Nonperishable

Inflammable

Noninflammable

Asset specificity and product complexity are two
different constructs, although frequently they are highly
correlated with each other empirically. Viewed from a
general system perspective at transactions and transaction
structures, asset specificity is related to process, and
product complexity is related to input and output. Asset
specificity is the consequence of capital, human, or
location investment in building the process. Product
complexity defines the properties of a product as input
and output going through the process.

Logical
Transferability

Low

Level of
information

Semantic

Level of
Knowledge

Deep

Parameter
Defindability

Undefinable

A product with high complexity usually requires a
process with high asset specificity. For example, a
spaceship has high product complexity in terms of
transferability, modularbility, and information
intensiveness. At the same time, the transaction of the
spaceship has high asset specificity, in terms of capital
specificity, human specificity, etc. In other examples, the
asset specificity is not correlated with product complexity.
Iron and steel making requires high asset specificity in
blast furnaces and rolling mills, or the locations of iron
ore mines. But steel as a product has low product
complexity.

Consequence
Predictability

Unpredictable

Predictable

Consequence
Measurability

Unmeasurable

Measurable

Transfer Loss
(Goodwill)

High

Small
Volume

Toxic
Fragile

Nontoxic
Durable
High
Syntactic
Shallow
Definable

Low

Product Transferability
Product transferability is the degree of ease of
transferring goods and services physically and logically
from one entity to another. Physical transfer is defined as
the transfer of the ownership of tangible part of a product
or service. Logical transfer is the transfer of the
ownership of intangible part of a product or service. For
example, a floppy disk with a stored program is tangible,
but knowledge of the program is intangible. Table 1
describes the elements of transferability.

Definitions
According to Simon, complexity comes in the form of
hierarchy, and a complex system consists of a large
number of parts that interact in a nonsimple manner
(Simon 62). Based on this idea, I define the concept of
Product Complexity as the degree of intricacy of product
hierarchy, and the degree of interactions within a product

1442

Proposition 1: The lower physical and logical
transferability of the product, the more favorable of
hierarchy.

The modular product design increases the flexibility and
adaptability of an organization. As a consequence, it has
significant influence upon the selection of transaction
governance structure and design of organizations.

Product Modularbility
Proposition 2: The lower modularbility of the product,
the more favorable of hierarchy.

Simon argues that complexity takes the form of
hierarchy, which is composed of interrelated subsystems
that in turn have their own subsystems, and so on (Simon
1962). Product modularbility is the degree of ease in
isolating a component or a group of components by
minimizing and standardizing its interaction with other
components within subsystems or between subsystems of a
product. A product can be decomposed into a hierarchical
system of functional components. For example, an
automobile has interrelated subsystems, such as cooling
system, brake system, steering system and so on. A cooling
system in turn has its own subsystems, such as water pump,
radiator, temperature control system, and so on. Modular
design intentionally creates a loose coupling between
components by standardizing component interface to create
a high degree of independence. The specifications of the
interfaces permit a range of variations in any given
component without requiring changes in the overall product
design (Orton and Weick 1990, Sanchez and Mahoney
1996).

Information Intensiveness
The trend of an information society is that information
and knowledge replace matter and energy as the primary
resource of economy. Information is no longer viewed as
an enabler to gain power or an asset to be controlled.
Rather, the power comes from turning information into
knowledge and from human expertise in managing
information. The emergence of information itself as an asset
in its own right has the significant marketplace value. Both
product and process are becoming more information and
knowledge intensive (Naisbitt 1982, Davis and Botkin
1994, Nonaka 1991, Ramaprasad and Rai 1996, Glazer
1991, Melody 1987).
.

There are two types of information, process and product
information. Process information facilitates transaction of
products and services. This type of information is
exchanged in coordination processes, reduces uncertainty,
changes an individual's degree of belief, and facilitates
decision making during the transaction process. Malone’s
complexity of product description fits into this category
since the information specifies the attributes of a product
that enable potential buyers to make purchasing decisions.
When the transaction is finished or coordination is
accomplished, the value of information diminishes for this
particular transaction. The information is converted into
part of organization memory or knowledge. In this study, I
refer the information related to the particular transaction as
process information, which is different from cumulated
processing information or knowledge, indicated by Glazer
(Glazer 1991).

(Sanchez 1995) suggests that, to a significant extent,
product designs constrain feasible choices of organization
structure designs. A product design with complex and
tightly integrated components requires an organizational
structure through which managerial authority can be readily
exercised to achieve close coordination of the units making
the separate components. Loosely coupled components
enable the use of organization designs with loosely coupled
structures, such as out sourcing, buying instead of making,
or long-term contracts with external producers (Sanchez
1995).
Modular product leads to modular organization design,
which can be used to achieve embedded coordination, i.e.,
they achieve coordination by means other than the overt
exercise of managerial authority. For example, the
producer of electric motors for washing machines need to
discuss the mounting dimensions, speed and torque
specification, deliver schedule with the washing machine
producer. Other coordination is embedded inside the motor
producer structure, such as coordination for production
schedule, material purchasing and inventory, personnel
schedule, and so on. Each participating entity can operate
autonomously and concurrently guided by embedded
coordination.

Product information has marketable value in itself and is
part of product or service offering. The value of
information is transferred to a buyer and stays with the
buyer. For example, credit card companies sell transaction
information to marketing research companies.
Information is given birth by, and lives its entire life
within, the perceiver's concerns (Metcalfe and Powell
1995). The concern of this study is transaction cost and
transaction structure, so the relevant information is the
information that lives in the domain of transaction
coordination and communication. The information
intensiveness is defined in terms of amount of information
and level of richness of information related to transaction
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product and process. Uncertainty and equivocality are the
two primary concerns for transaction information
processing. According to Daft and Lengel, organization
structure and internal systems determine both the amount
and richness of information provided to members (Daft and
Lengel 1986). The reciprocal interpretation would be that
the amount and richness of information shapes and
influences the choice of organizational structure designs.
The four scales measuring the information intensiveness
are represented in Table 2.

Chandler, Alfred Dupont. The visible hand: the
managerial revolution in American business, Belknap
Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1977.

Table 2. Scales for information intensiveness

Davis, Stan and Jim Botkin, "The Coming of KnowledgeBased Business," Harvard Business Review (72:5), 1994,
pp. 165-170.

Process
C
C
Product
C
C

Amount
Richness
Amount
Richness

Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

Coase, R.H. The Nature of the Firm, Economica,
November 1937, pp.386-405.
Daft, R.L., and Lengel, R. H. "Organizational Information
Requirements, Media Richness and Structural Design,"
Management Science (32:5), 1986, pp. 554-571.

High
High
High
High
High
High

Glazer, Rashi, "Marketing in an Information-Intensive
Environment: Strategic Implications of Knowledge as an
Asset," Journal of Marketing (55:4), 1991, pp. 1-19.
Gurbaxani, Vijay and Seungjin Whang, "The Impact of
Information Systems on Organizations and Markets,"
Communications of the ACM (34:1), 1991, pp. 59-73.

Proposition 3: The higher information intensiveness
of the product, the more favorable of hierarchy.

Malone, Thomas W., Joanne Yates and Robert I.
Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic
Hierarchies, Communications of the ACM (30:6), 1987,
pp. 484-497.

Methodology and Future Studies
Although there are numerous transaction structure
studies, we still lack valid measurements, especially
measurement of transaction costs. Due to the limited
space, methodology and data analysis will not be
included. However, for measurements on asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency, please refer to
(Aubert 1996). There will be different measurements for
product complexity in different industries and contexts.
The measurements on product complexity will be
facilitated by the detailed specification of the constructs.
Multiple items for each construct will be generated and
assessed for reliability and validity. The new constructs
are expected to be highly correlated with coordination
cost and transaction cost which in turn influence the
selection of transaction structure. This paper will provide
a foundation for future experimental research in
organization transformation. The more consistent
experimental results and accurate prediction on structure
change are expected by applying the product complexity
in the future studies.
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